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Erratum 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 36--38 (2000)
The following paragraph should replace the paragraph that appeared at the
end of page 36 and beginning of page 37 of Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against
Women and the Persistence ofPrivacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000):
Under the most widely used civil rights statutes, relief is rarely available for
violence against women. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to
show that the challenged action was taken under color of state law, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) requires her to show a conspiracy to deprive her of an independent,
federally protected right. These elements are far from common in a typical rape
or domestic violence case. On the contrary, most of the violence committed
against women occurs in the context of the family and other ongoing
relationships.18 8 Relatively few acts of sexual assault and battering can be
directly attributed to state actors. Almost no cases involve a conspiracy to
deprive the plaintiff of a right protected by federal law, particularly since most of
those rights require, in turn, a showing of state action. 189 Therefore, laws
designed to protect individuals from state encroachment on their rights have
done little to redress the harm inflicted on women by male violence. This
omission is especially noteworthy because violence is among the principal ways
in which women's inequality is expressed and perpetuated.1 90
In addition, the following paragraph should replace the paragraph that
appeared at the end of page 37 and beginning of page 38 of the same article:
There are, of course, cases of violence against women committed by state
actors.191 Even here, however, the reluctance to view violence against women as
belonging to the public sphere is evident. For example, in the case of United
States v. Lanier, 192 the Supreme Court considered an appeal by a state judge who
had been convicted under a federal criminal civil rights statute for sexually
188 See supra Part II.
189 See, e.g., Un ited Brotherhood of Carpenters, 463 U.S. 825.
190 See supra Part II.
191 For a thoughtful discussion of sexual assault by state actors, see generally Johanna R.
Shargel, United States v. Lanier: Securing the Freedom to Choose, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115
(1997).
192 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (vacating judgment below and remanding for consideration of
whether defendant had fair warning that his actions violated federal criminal civil rights
statute).
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assaulting five women.193 All of the women were with Judge Lanier on official
court business when he attacked them; each of the women was a former litigant
or present or potential employee over whom Judge Lanier had authority by virtue
of his office.194 The crimes occurred in the judge's chambers during working
hours, and in at least one instance, he committed a sexual assault while wearing
his judicial robe. 195 Thus, it would seem that the element of action taken under
color of state law was established beyond any question. However, when
appealing his conviction before the Supreme Court, Judge Lanier claimed that
his actions were not taken under color of law because acts of sexual assault are
so unrelated to the role of a state judge that he could not have been acting under
the pretense of exercising his legitimate authority when he committed them. 196
In other words, this argument goes, violence against women is intrinsically
private and can never be considered part of the public, state sphere. 197
Additionally, Judge Lanier argued that his due process rights had been violated
because he was deprived of fair warning that sexually assaulting women under
his control would be considered a violation of their constitutional rights.198
Again, this argument rests on the assertion that violence against women is a
subject so remote from federal constitutional rights as to make it impossible to
foresee the application of the latter to the former.1 99
193 See id. The statute under which Judge Lanier was convicted criminalizes the willful
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States by persons acting under color of law. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
194 See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261.
195 See United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 646-50, 653 (6th Cir. 1994), vacated and
reh'g en banc granted, 43 F.3d 1033 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
bane), vacated and remanded, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
196 See United States v. Lanier, No. 95-1717, 1997 WL 7587 at *25-*37 (Jan. 7, 1997)
(transcript of oral argument of counsel for the defendant).
197 The Supreme Court explicitly declined to address this argument See Lanier, 520 U.S.
at 264 n.2. However, the earlier decision of the three-judge panel below, which was vacated
when the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en bane, had specifically rejected Judge Lanier's
argument that his actions were "personal pursuits." See Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1397 (Wellford, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lanier, 33 F.3d at 653).
198 See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265-72.
199 The Supreme Court remanded to the Sixth Circuit for a determination of whether the
statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that
the defendant's conduct was criminal. See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 272. The Sixth Circuit later
dismissed the appeal without a decision on the merits because Judge Lanier had become a
fugitive. See United States v. Lanier, 123 F.3d 945,946 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1011 (1998).
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